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Securitization and militarization
lecture seemed to present an opportunity to take stock of this process, and in particular to cast a sceptical eye on the sense of inexorability that often seemed to accompany it, not least from its most vocal critics. What follows is a lightly edited version of my oral presentation, written within weeks of the change of government, an attempt if you will, to emulate Benjamin's injunction to "seize hold of a memory as it flashes up" (Benjamin 1969: 255) . Other, more sober, accounts of the war and its aftermath will follow in the years to come.
The word "securitization" in my title was taken from the theme of the BASAS conference, but the phenomenon I will sketch is as often referred to as which is beginning to get the chroniclers and analysts it deserves -I'm thinking of recent publications by Rohini Mohan (2014) and David Keen (2014) , for example. My topic is closer to Ayesha Siddiqa's Military Inc (2007) , which provides a detailed and compelling account of Pakistan's military economy, although my analytical strategy is somewhat different from Siddiqa's. The difference is not simply that my version is shorter. It is also that the phenomena I describe may turn out to be more ephemeral and shallow than the history Siddiqa charts in Pakistan. Or it may not. I will return to this question -which we can think of as the temporality of militarization -at the end of this article.
I start with a document and a question. On the day of the Presidential Election in
January 2015 billboards appeared in Colombo, uncaptioned, with images of the aftermath of horrifying moments from the war. They were, in a sense, the final word (or the final lack of words) in a strange election campaign, in which the incumbent regime first accused the opposition of threatening a return to civil war, initially with fanciful stories of the return of the vanquished LTTE, then with mobile screens which were set up in public spaces rerunning footage of the worst excesses of the war.
Then, when the campaigning officially stopped two days before the vote, the government flooded the TV and newspapers with ever more grisly reminders of the war. Finally on polling day itself billboards appeared in Colombo with scenes from the dark days of the war, unaccompanied by any caption.
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The document I want to discuss followed 10 days after Rajapaksa's defeat. It is the Authority. Nothing too surprising here (apart, maybe, from the baroque titles of the ministries themselves) except that the agencies I have highlighted -police, immigration and urban development -had been, until a week earlier, formally part of the ever expanding empire of the Ministry of Defence, which itself was firmly under the control of the President's brother Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. For a few heady weeks after the election, the news was punctuated by announcements of other things the Ministry of Defence would not be doing. The leadership training programme for undergraduate entrants to the country's universities -a boot-camp for entire batches of would-be students, run by the security forces and intended to instil the kind of discipline that would put an end to ragging and protest on campus -was summarily discontinued. Urban development contracts would no longer be awarded to the army, except where there were significant cost savings, and even then soldiers would not be employed in menial tasks like the clearance of weed-and garbagechoked canals. The military training programme that gave school headteachers military ranks was suspended. It was reported (and subsequently denied) that the security forces had stopped checking vehicles at the last surviving checkpoint on the road to Jaffna and the north. And around this frenzy of demilitarization, the new government seemed determined to perform its own retreat from securitization:
colleagues from the Federation of University Teachers Association, summoned to a meeting with the Prime Minister, were astonished to find themselves wandering unchecked into his official residence, with barely a soldier or policeman in sight.
6 So, on the one hand a government on the slide that seemed desperate to maintain the sense of a country at permanent war, and on the other, a new government, dismantling some of the more unlikely outposts of Sri Lanka's experiment in securitization -securitization as political spectacle and desecuritization by To all intents and purposes it looked as if this landscape had been politically tamed.
There were no signs at all of a revival of the LTTE, and almost no expressions of visible protest against the military presence. This changed briefly, but in a rather extraordinary way, when in July and August 2011, two years after the end of the war, the island was swept by rumours, followed in some cases by vigilante attacks (including a number of killings). The rumours concerned "grease devils", men who cover their half-naked bodies with grease in order to evade capture, and who lurk in the shadows, waiting to attack unprotected women. The rumours started in the central hills of the island, then moved to Up-Country Tamil workers on tea estates in the mountains, and then on to the Muslim and Tamil areas of the country's north and east. Here they sparked confrontations with the police, the army and the navy. Grease devils had been seen coming from, or running back to, army bases. For the first, and so far only, time since the end of the war, the security forces found themselves openly challenged by angry protestors. Not only that, on two occasions members of the security forces were killed in the protests. Outside Trincomalee a crowd attacked a navy base, where a grease devil was thought to be sheltering. In Puttalam a policeman was killed. Then, as mysteriously as they had arrived, reports of the attacks declined and then stopped altogether within a few weeks.
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Sensing they were losing control of the situation, the government responded with various statements which attempted to reassure the public and calm the situation. In one especially bizarre initiative, Muslim leaders from the north and east were summoned to the Ministry of Defence in Colombo to be addressed by the President's brother who controlled that all-powerful ministry. From the viewpoint of middle-class Colombo, much of what was happening seemed alternately comic and frightening.
There was endless speculation about what all this might signify, but no one amongst the usual (academic left-wing) suspects with whom I was hanging out actually believed there were "real" attacks being made by "real" grease devils. That is, until I spoke to a Tamil friend from the east, a seasoned observer and activist, who was as shocked at the suggestion that the attacks were not real as I was at her insistence that they were. For people living in the north and east, the rumours of predatory men attacking women did not represent a dramatic break from the "normal" rhythms of life. Instead they were continuous with a history of sexual violence employed by elements within the military during and after the counter-insurgency against the LTTE. In the words of one activist quoted in an ICG report on women's insecurity in the north and east, released a few months after the grease devil attacks: "You simply cannot have that many attacks without the endorsement of the security forces" (ICG 2011: 37).
There is much that remains mysterious in the 2011 grease devil panic, as a recent article by Venugopal (2015) makes clear. But certain themes run through all the stories. As well as the dangers of predatory male sexuality, and the attendant vulnerability of unprotected women, there is the link to the military. In the south for pretty obvious reasons, the military uncanny is not attached to the actual soldiers who had fought the LTTE in the north, but instead to the murky figure of the deserter, who could be seen to embody in sublimated form the anxieties provoked by the ubiquitous military presence. In the north and east, there is no parallel embarrassment about seeing erstwhile heroes as threats, so the link is more direct: the grease devil is just the latest manifestation of a violent and threatening military presence. In both settings everyday militarisation can be linked to a pervasive sense of insecurity, an insecurity which focuses on the threats to women posed by dominant versions of militarized masculinity, and which thrives in the atmosphere of uncertainty and rumour that has lingered long after the end of the war. too did his public role, which over the years has sometimes seemed to eclipse that of his brother the President. As well as surveillance and governance work in the north and east, the military opened tourist hotels, golf courses, and restaurants. When vegetable prices rose, they started selling vegetables. Colombo commuters could buy their lunchtime rice packets from military rice-and-curry stalls. University students were sent on "leadership training" boot camps, run by the military, and intended to foment the kind of discipline that would put an end to ragging and student protest. School principals were also sent for military training, returning to their schools with military ranks like captain or lieutenant. GR's fame rose too. If his own increasingly fraught relations with the media weren't enough to get him coverage, the Ministry of Defence website made sure his every thought and deed got maximum exposure.
The military in the city
In April 2010, the Urban Development Authority, a legacy from President Premadasa's work to upgrade low-income housing areas in the 1980s, was transferred to the Ministry of Defence, where it was immediately used as a vehicle for a project of aggressive "beautification" of the country's biggest city Colombo. The beautification of Colombo has obvious parallels with developments in many other cities across South Asia in the past decade, a process illuminatingly reviewed in a recent article by Nandini Gooptu (2011) . But the Colombo version of the subcontinental mania for creating "world-class" cities, has its distinctive features. One is the peculiar mixture of military personnel and speculative capital that has gone into the remaking of urban space, the military muscle promising a way through the endless legal entanglements of urban land tenure, as well as the bodies to do the physical work of laying pavements and clearing canals. A second is GR's concern with discipline, a concern that recurs in his public statements at this time and which evokes the military man's impatience with the indiscipline of the non-military world where citizens have a stubborn habit of ignoring the rules if it so suits them. Nothing better exemplifies this indiscipline than politics, and GR used his ambiguous position -not a soldier as such, but neither a politician -to project a sense of himself as a man who can get things done without worrying about the tiresome constraints of those who need at some point to mobilize the votes of the people affected by urban change. In the year before his brother's electoral nemesis, there were persistent reports that Gotabhaya was preparing to formally enter politics, possibly as an MP for the Colombo area, probably as Prime Minister to his brother's Presidency. GR himself, in a number of interviews, seemed to endorse many of the BSS criticisms of the Muslim community, but in his public actions he alternated between identification with BBS, and interventions apparently intended to repair relations with 19 those affected by their activities -after the security forces appeared to allow the crowds to destroy Muslim property in Aluthgama, navy personnel were sent to help in the rebuilding. How much the BBS did owe to the support and patronage of GR is still unclear, but many commentators have noted their near total eclipse since his loss of power in January, and drawn a rather obvious conclusion.
For all his public concern with discipline, GR's own modus operandi as a public figure seemed more often to be improvisational to the point of impetuosity. Similarly, his experiments in militarisation might have extended the reach of the military into hitherto untouched areas -schools, universities, rice-and-curry stands -but they did so in an uneven and often contentious way.
The long post-war ended? and East, and enough support elsewhere, the maths were on Sirisena's side. The only question was whether or not they would be allowed to win. What happened in the final hours of the Rajapaksa Presidency is murky and disputed, but it was widely reported that an attempt to halt the count and declare a state of emergency was blocked by the attorney-general, and the heads of the police and the armed forces, all of whom had been summoned to the Presidential residence.
There then followed the process of public dismantling that started with the Gazette announcements I cited at the start of this paper. The UDA was not merely taken away from the Ministry of Defence, it was allocated to a Ministry presided over by the leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress. The security forces ceded their involvement in urban development, and in disciplining students and teachers, with not a murmur of complaint, and it is hard not to infer some degree of prior collusion between senior figures in the armed forces and the victorious opposition about the aspects of the militarization project that could be treated as disposable. These were essentially those aspects most closely identified with the figure of GR and his experiments in what we might call, after Thomas Hansen (2001) , militarized antipolitics.
Other aspects of militarization, especially those that I sketched at the start of the paper, look to be more durable, for now at least. There were important concessions in the north: the military governor in Jaffna was replaced by a civilian and there is a real prospect that the devolved provincial council will be allowed to exercise some power. Some of the land taken by the military in the north has been handed back. The army presence in the north and east represents a deeper kind of militarization, which is unlikely to be evaporate in a haze of post-election optimism. The psychic discontents that found brief expression in the grease devil panic are also unlikely to disappear. The hidden wounds of years of war are still there in all communities and will be for years to come. But one thing I have learnt in these last years is the dangers of prognostication. When writing about the beautification project in Colombo, it seemed to me important to resist the temptation to concede that everything GR wanted to do he could and would do. One very obvious aspect of his project was the attempt to perform a certain omnipotence, and one danger for analysts would be that academic pessimism might unwittingly collude with the fantasies of the powerful.
In September 2015, after a further parliamentary election had confirmed that Rajapaksa's regime was no more, I spent an afternoon at an extraordinary exhibition in a semi-ruined cinema complex in the heart of Slave Island 
